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I. INTRODUCTION
"Predictive analytics" refers to the use of statistically analyzed data
to predict future outcomes. Public and private actors constantly use
this method in an increasingly data-driven world.' For example,
baseball teams analyze past data to recruit professional baseball
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See, e.g., CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 61 (2016); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK,
AND THINK 58 (2013).
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players based on anticipated performance.2 Beyond sports, predictive
analytics informs decisions about employment,3 advertising,4
healthcares and more.6 Researchers find that using data can
outperform individual, qualitative, seat of the pants predictions about
what people want, what people do, and how people will perform in the
future. This information benefits various actors - for example, the
baseball recruiter - by providing overlooked or otherwise invisible
insight regarding how to maximize desired outcomes in light of this
information.
The 2017 I/S Symposium on Predictive Analytics, Law, and Policy
explored tensions that arise in the application of this technique in
various contexts. This invited contribution considers tensions that
arise in its application to one public sector function: the imposition of
punishment in the criminal justice system. In this context, developers
apply predictive analytics to construct actuarial risk assessment tools
that estimate whether individuals facing punishment will engage in
specific behavior in the future.7 As the argument goes, since judges
inevitably predict future behavior in the decision-making process,
predictive analytics can help them to do it better.8
2 See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 135
(2003).
3 Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2015, at SR4.
4 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at SM3o.
5 Bernard Marr, How Big Data is Changing Healthcare, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2o15/o4/21/how-big-data-is-changing-
healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/3LJB-KF4B] ("Big Data in healthcare is being used to
predict epidemics, cure disease, improve quality of life and avoid preventable deaths.").
6 Vivek Wadhwa, The Rise of Big Data Brings Tremendous Possibilities and Frightening
Perils, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2o14/o4/18/the-rise-of-big-
data-brings-tremendous-possibilities-and-frightening-perils/?utm-term=.83e2eloaO267
[https://perma.cc/N2HD-ALAM].
7 On development of actuarial risk assessment tools for sentencing, see BERNARD E.
HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL
AGE 1 (2007); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59 (2017)
[hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism]; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing
and the Scientific Rationalization ofDiscrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 809 (2014).
8 Regarding the use of prediction, see, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976)
("[P]rediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions
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"Risk-based sentencing" - meaning the use of actuarial risk
assessments to inform judicial determinations of punishment - is
presented as a well-intentioned and neutral intervention to improve a
flawed and at times unnecessarily punitive system.9 But successful
application of the information produced to individual sentences
demands critical reflection and innovation about the aims of the
system and how actuarial tools are constructed. Otherwise, predictive
analytics can create mismatches between what the tools do and the
aims of the society.
Improvements in the method of prediction at sentencing do not
ensure reflection. Indeed, predictive analytics' emphasis on
repurposing existing data may invite developers to take the easy route
in construction choices and reinforce flaws in the present system.
Both results are counterproductive to efforts intended to address the
economic and social costs of unnecessary reliance on incarceration in
the justice system. These concerns demonstrate that scholars and
policymakers who seek these decarcerative aims should engage with
the politics of risk knowledge production in the criminal justice
system.10
rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a
defendant on bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's prediction of the defendant's
future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable
future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.
For those sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole
authorities."). Regarding the argument that risk assessment tools can improve decision
making by informing judicial discretion about risk, see, Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in
Motion: The Promise and Perils ofIncorporating Risk Assessments and Cost-Benefit
Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DuQ. L. REV. 707, 713 (2011).
9 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence ofRisk Assessment
in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 158, 158 (2014) (noting consensus among
politicians regarding the promise of risk-based sentencing to address flaws in the justice
system).
1A growing contingent of scholars considers the production of information in the criminal
justice system. See, e.g., Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 Geo. L.J. 1245 (2016). At the
same time, Science and Technology Studies literature considers the politics of expert
knowledge production in the criminal justice system and outside it. See, e.g., SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON (2012). Furthermore, a growing literature
considers the specific role of risk in the administration of criminal justice. See, e.g., Kelly
Hannah-Moffat, Punishment and Risk, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND
SOCIETY (Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks eds. 2013) (encouraging law and policymakers
focused on addressing mass incarceration to engage further with these works going
forward).
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Part II discusses the entry of predictive analytics into criminal
justice. While forms of prediction have existed in the system for
decades, the cultural resonance of big data and evidence-based
criminal justice reforms drives a resurgence illustrated by the
popularity of actuarial risk tools for sentencing. Part III explores
potential tensions that may arise when applying predictive analytics to
construct actuarial risk tools used for sentencing. Drawing on insight
from a recent article, Constructing Recidivism Risk," Part III
illuminates important and contested policy questions about why and
how we punish potentially obscured in the construction process. Part
IV urges further engagement with the politics of risk knowledge
production. Recidivism risk is a malleable concept that sets agendas.
Though risk tools may alter the administration of justice,
interventions are necessary to assure these changes further the aims
of society.
II. PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS FOR PUNISHMENT
Analytics in some form has existed in the criminal justice system
for a long time. CompStat, the police management technique
developed in the New York City Police Department in 1994, harnessed
data analytics to map crime and allocate police resources.' Similarly,
prediction in some form has existed in the imposition of punishment
for a long time. Clinical predictions of risk (meaning those conducted
by skilled practitioners like psychologists) frequently appear in death
Note, the term "decarcerative" is used broadly here. Efforts to address the social and
economic costs of mass incarceration requires decarceration. See Jessica M. Eaglin,
Against Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 225 (2013) [hereinafter Eaglin, Against
Neorehabilitation] ("Given that the costs of maintaining a prison, even without increasing
the number of prisoners, still continue to rise every year, states cannot hope to decrease
costs without decreasing prisoners."); Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 55
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 602-03 (2016) [hereinafter Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm]
(discussing economic and social pressures of incarceration on the states).
11 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7.
12 See Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Director, Office of Policy and Legislation, Dep't
of Justice, to Patti B. Saris, Chair, Sentencing Comm'n (July 29, 2014),
https://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/o8/ol/2014annual-
letter-final-o72814.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3TM-A6JQ] (pointing to CompStat as an
example of criminal justice analytics); OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 9 (2015) (describing CompStat's origin and
expansion).
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penalty sentencing hearings.3 Parole boards have long considered risk
as a component of the parole release determination.14
We are now witnessing a resurgence of prediction and the
expansion of analytics into the imposition of punishment.1s Law and
policymakers have introduced reforms focused on informing various
criminal justice actors' individual decisions about punishment with
data-driven risk assessments to estimate the likelihood of a defendant
engaging in specific behavior in the future. As a prominent example,
the National Institute of Corrections in partnership with the Center
for Effective Public Policy rolled out an initiative to advance
"evidence-based decision making" across select local justice systems
in Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin.16
Simultaneously, various criminal justice agencies and actors have
adopted risk assessment tools for sentencing either of their own..
accord or due to encouragement by state or local government.17 At
times these reforms are presented as part of a broader shift towards
evidence-based practices.' At times advocates seek to integrate this
information into decision making independent of that movement.' 9
13 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899-9oo (1983) (psychologist predicting
recidivism risk); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 7 5 9 (2017) (reversing and remanding
death penalty sentence where psychologist predicted whether defendant poses risk to
society based in part on race).
,4 See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 48-76 (2005) (discussing the use and development of
actuarial risk tools for parole decision making); see also, e.g., W. David Ball, Normative
Elements ofParole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (2011) (exploring the limits of
actuarialism in parole release decision making).
15 See, e.g., Monahan & Skeem, supra note 1o; Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in
the Prediction ofRecidivism, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 167 (2014).
16 Info, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, https://info.nicic.gov/ebdm/
[https://perma.c/5KSK-B3G5]; see also CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PUB. POL'Y ET AL., A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
6 (3d ed. 2010), http://cepp.com/wp-content/uploads/2o15/2/A-framework-for-
evidence-based-decision-making-in-local-criminal-justice-systems.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8FHL-H6S9].
17 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 114-15.
18 Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils ofEvidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 537, 564-67 (2015).
'9 In a sense, most jurisdictions have adopted risk assessment tools at sentencing outside
the "evidence-based" criminal justice movement because little evidence exists to prove that
2017] 91
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Constructing Recidivism Risk describes the development of
various risk assessment tools used for sentencing. Public agencies,
private companies, and non-profit organizations develop tools to
estimate a defendant's likelihood of engaging in specific future
behavior.20 Developers use statistical analysis of people previously
arrested or convicted of crimes to identify factors that correlate with
the occurrence of a particular triggering event, defined as recidivism,
in the future.21 Drawing upon empirical research on recidivism,
developers then select factors from the statistical model and weight it
to approximate the model's outcomes in a simplified actuarial risk
tool.22 Developers then translate the tool's numerical outcome - a
number indicating a statistical probability of the defendant engaging
in the specified behavior - into a qualitative risk category. 23 The
categories are usually high, medium, or low risk of recidivism.
Actuarial risk assessment tools have been heralded as a new
solution at sentencing meant to improve allocation of resources
through objective, consistent, and neutral assessment. 24 Enthusiasm
for the tools can be understood in part by the cultural embrace of
the predictive tools "work." See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment
(forthcoming 2018) (noting the scant empirical research on the implementation of risk
assessment tools in the criminal justice system and examining their impact in the pretrial
context); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1115,1167-68 (2017) (noting the limited and ambivalent evidence that predictive
policing technologies cause crime reductions). State agencies adopt the tools and
encourage the practice anyway. See infra note 25.
20 See, e.g., Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 69-71; Melissa Hamilton,
Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 9 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization ofDiscrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803,848 (2014).
21 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, 72-84.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 85-87.
24 See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 19, at 1122 ("Predictive tools ... seek to help make these
difficult, life-altering decisions more objective and fair"); Nathan James, Risk and Needs
Assessment in the Criminal Justice System, CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 13, 2015) ("Assessment
instruments might help increase the efficiency of the justice system by identifying low-risk
offenders who could be effectively managed on probation rather than incarcerated, and
they might help identify high-risk offenders who would gain the most by being placed in
rehabilitative programs."); Starr, supra note 20, at 815-16 (summarizing arguments in
favor of risk tools at sentencing).
92 [Vol. 14-1L
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data-driven interventions to reduce or eliminate human errors in
various fields and bipartisan interest in criminal justice reform.25 Like
other instances of predictive analytics, these tools are meant to
provide new insight for courts potentially unseen without data. Here,
the insight concerns which defendants present a public safety risk. At
sentencing, courts use the tools to determine whether to incarcerate or
place a defendant on probation, how long the term of punishment
should be, and what additional conditions to impose as part of the
term of punishment.2 6 Though not without controversy,27 the practice
continues to expand.2 8
25 See, e.g., Klingele, supra note 18, at 565 (explaining the bipartisan appeal of data-driven
reforms in sentencing and corrections); see also Note, State v. Loomis: Wisconsin Supreme
Court Requires Warning Before Use ofAlgorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530 (2017) (attributing resonance of risk assessments for sentencing
to "bipartisan interest in criminal justice reform and the rise of big data").
26 See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT'L CFR. FOR STATE COURTS, USING OFFENDER RISK
AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS FROM A
NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 4 (2011),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/RNA%2oGuide%2oFinal.ashx
[https://perma.ce/A4JA-N9CG].
27 See Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., Remarks at the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-
association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/8CXF-BZA3]; Sonja B. Starr,
Opinion, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/o8/11/opinion/sentencing-by-the-numbers.html; Anna
Maria Barry-Jester et al., The New Science of Sentencing, MARSHALL PROJEcr (Aug. 4,
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/o8/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/UED-3YPRI.
28 "Expansion" here means tools utilized in predictive analytics continue to evolve with new
technology, see Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 69 1-41, and the
development of tools applying these techniques for decision making in different areas of
the criminal justice system increases, see, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive
Prosecutions, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 707 (2016). Though this piece primarily
focuses on post-conviction sentencing, similar tools have developed in different contexts
relating to the imposition of punishment, including pretrial detention and corrections. See,
e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEx. L. REV. 497, 500
(2012) (pretrial); Lauryn Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (pretrial); Klingele, supra note 18 (corrections); Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform and
Restraint for Dangerousness: Are Defendants a Special Case?, YALE L. J. (forthcoming
2017) (pretrial).
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1II. THE TENSIONS
Actuarial risk assessment tools used at sentencing harness
predictive analytics to produce information (a risk score classifies a
defendant as low, medium, or high risk) that shapes sentencing
outcomes. Yet tool results reflect important and contested policy
choices about how, what, and why we punish determined in the
construction process. This section highlights a few normative
questions necessarily implicated in the construction process.29
Tensions may arise if developers construct tools that contradict the
values or aims of the jurisdiction using the tool.
Prediction does not exist in a vacuum in the criminal justice
system. Developers require precise understanding about the purpose
of the system to determine how predictive analytics may assist in
achieving its specific goals.30 As such, prediction becomes intertwined
with normative judgments about punishment and justice. To answer
the necessary questions regarding what to predict and why requires
reference to why we punish and how. Because we care about how we
punish, we also care about how we predict. These questions are
normative, not empirical, and deeply contested. Whether and how
these issues are resolved in the application of predictive analytics can
produce mismatches between the tools and the system it aims to
improve.
Why to Predict. Tensions arise when resolving whether and why to
predict for punishment. The application of predictive analytics
requires precise understanding about why the information is being
produced. At sentencing, this requires clarity about the purpose of
punishment. There are four basic theoretical options: retribution,
29 Constructing Recidivism Risk provides a more complete discussion of the normative
questions raised during the construction of actuarial risk tools for sentencing. A major
decision not discussed here concerns how developers translate numerical risk estimates
into qualitative risk categories. See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7.
3o The aims of the criminal justice system are not always clear and precise. For an example
of a precise outcome from another context, statisticians harnessed predictive analytics in
baseball to achieve a singular aim: increase wins. Predictive analytics assisted towards this
goal by illustrating that certain metrics, like runs batted in, did not correlate to wins,
contrary to popular knowledge. It exposed other, previously hidden or overlooked variables
with ramifications for wins. The application of predictive analytics in this context was
successful because the aim (winning) was clear. See generally Lewis, supra note 2.
Additional thanks to Professor David Ball for insight on baseball.
[Vol. 14.194
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.31 Likelihood of engaging
in future behavior only relates to the three utilitarian aims: deterring
crime, incapacitating dangerous offenders, and rehabilitating an
offender. If the aim of punishment is purely retributive, the tools have
no place because an offender's future conduct is not relevant to a
determination about past behavior.32
As a practical matter, most states allow courts to pursue any of the
four purposes of punishment at sentencing.33 Yet even if future
behavior is considered at sentencing, whether an actuarial risk tool
provides valuable information to determine the length of a sentence is
contested. If tools are meant to influence decisions about
incapacitation or deterrence - as it appears they are at sentencing34 -
then they should consider how a sentence impacts the defendant's
likelihood of engaging in future criminal behavior.35 If a jurisdiction
adopts a risk assessment tool to improve correctional rehabilitation
efforts, then the outcomes should not affect how long a defendant is
punished.3 6 Currently, most actuarial risk tools do not specify their
aim. Even those actuarial risk tools developed for rehabilitative
31 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
4(2010).
32 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention
as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1440-41 (2001).
33 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 684 (2015).
34 Risk tools can be used to identify the select few individuals who require more
punishment through incapacitation to deter recidivism. See Kelly Hannah-Moffat,
Punishment and Risk, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY lo (Jonathan
Simon & Richard Sparks eds. 2013). This is selective incapacitation. See, Eaglin,
Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 222-23. Incapacitation includes more than just
incarceration. Additional forms of criminal justice supervision, including treatment
programs, represents incapacitating interventions as well. See Eaglin, The Drug Court
Paradigm, supra note lo, at 632 (describing incapacitating conditions of criminal justice
supervision other than incarceration).
35 Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 7, at 855-58; Sonja B. Starr, The New
Profiling: Why Punishing Based on Poverty and Identity is Unconstitutional and Wrong,
27 FED. SENT'G REP. 229 (2015); Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 141.
36 The "rehabilitative risk model" encourages sanctions that reduce recidivism, like
treatment interventions. Nevertheless, "offenders who score high on rehabilitative-
oriented risk-need scales will continue to endure incapacitation, especially if they are
classified as non-responsive to treatment." Hannah-Moffat, supra note 34, at lo. When
this information is used at sentencing, it increases punishment through incapacitation. See
supra note 34.
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purposes may be used to further different sentencing aims.37 These
challenges can create a mismatch between tool design, use, and the
aims of the justice system.
What to Predict. Developers interested in applying predictive
analytics for sentencing converge around estimating the likelihood of
a defendant recidivating in the future. "Recidivism," meaning the
recurrence of criminal behavior in the future, is an ambiguous term.3 8
For example, tools vary in the outcomes they choose to predict.
Different tools can predict the occurrence of a violent offense, a
property offense, or criminal behavior in general. That event may be
measured by an arrest, an arrest and charge, conviction, or some other
interaction with the justice system.39
How developers define the outcome of interest is a policy decision
that can create tensions between the tool and its application for
punishment. For example, some states prohibit considering
unadjudicated behavior, so the value of information that predicts the
occurrence of an arrest is dubious.4o More broadly, whether a
defendant engages in any type of behavior that could result in re-
arrest, such as failure to pay court fines or even speeding, does not
necessarily relate to the public safety risk the tools are meant to
address.41
These challenges are not limited to sentencing, as the pretrial bail
context provides another poignant example of the policy implications
of defining outcomes for tools using predictive analytics to improve
decision-making that leads to incarceration.42 Most pretrial risk tools
37 Often states or jurisdictions place no limits on which kinds of risk tools may be
considered at sentencing. See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 114-15.
38 Joan Petersilia, Recidivism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 382, 382-86
(Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996); Robert Weisberg, Meanings and
Measures ofRecidivism, S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 785 (2014).
39 See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 75-78.
40 See, e.g., Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45
STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993) (challenging policy reasons for relying on unadjudicated conduct
at sentencing).
41 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 75-77, 116.
- The aims of pretrial detention are not "punitive" like post-conviction sentencing, and
therefore the use of risk assessment tools at pretrial bail hearings does not create some of
the other tensions discussed in this essay. Still, the pretrial determination to detain a
96 [Vol.14-1
predict a defendant's risk of "pretrial failure."43 Yet whether pretrial
failure is a valuable metric for a judge to determine whether to detain
a defendant before trial is not a foregone conclusion. As Professor
Lauryn Gouldin explains, tools often combine failure to appear and
dangerousness into a single outcome. Yet failure to appear does not
equate public safety risk.44 This event .of interest produces information
that may not improve a judge's pretrial risk management task.45
The point here is simple: the value of the risk assessment centers
on what the tool predicts. What the tool predicts relates to why the
tools are used at a particular point in the administration of justice.
How developers choose to define the event of interest may create a
mismatch between tools utilizing predictive analytics and the aims of
the justice system.
How to Predict. What counts at sentencing has been the source of
longstanding debate. While judges once had broad discretion to
sentence for any reason at all, many states and the federal government
have limited the factors that courts can consider when imposing
punishment as a means to ensure fairness.4 6 Tensions arise when
predictive analytics consider factors that may undermine conceptions
of procedural justice in the criminal justice system.47
defendant on bail leads to incarceration, and so similarities exist between these
applications of predictive analytics to improve allocation of resources. See Laura I.
Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment & The Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1297, 1302 (2012) (noting that we classify pretrial
treatment as "detention" and not "punishment," but arguing for procedural protections
because the experience of incarceration is inherently punitive).
43 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 BYU L. REv.
837, 842, 867-71 (2016) [hereinafter Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk] (explaining that
pretrial risk assessment tools often conflate flight risk and dangerousness).
44 Id. at 842. Even predicting "failure to appear" creates important policy concerns. See
also Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
45 Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk, supra note 43, at 888-90.
46 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 84; see also Monahan & Skeem, supra
note 9, at 161.
47 "Procedural justice" refers to "the psychological links people tend to draw between
characteristics of legal practices and of interactions that citizens have with legal authorities
and their conclusions that laws, systems, or authorities are fair." Benjamin Justice &
Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 ANN. AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159 (2014); see generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (expanding the concept of procedural justice
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Actuarial risk tools rely on a variety of pre-identified factors that
correlate with the occurrence of the triggering event to determine
likelihood of recidivism.4 8 Some of these factors, like gender, cannot
be considered directly at sentencing.49 Others, like employment,
education level, and family ties, may not be permissible factors
depending on the jurisdiction. Several scholars have objected to the
use of risk tools at sentencing because risk tools consider some or all
of these factors. These critiques, including my own,50 focus on the
constitutional or public policy infirmities of these factors at
sentencing. 5'
Whether tools relying on these factors are relevant at sentencing
highlights a deeper question about what makes a sentence fair. Should
the state differentiate between defendants on the basis of risk as
defined by factors outside an individual's control at sentencing? This
question concerns how we punish and how we predict. Some scholars
first introduced by social psychologist John Thibault and law professor Laurens Walker.
JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1st ed. 1976)).
48 Current tools used at sentencing rely on factors identified by developers consistent with
empirical research, but future tools may rely on any factors that correlate with the
occurrence of the event of interest as identified by machine. Eaglin, supra note 7, at 119-
20; see generally RICHARD BERK, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FORECASTS OF RISK: A MACHINE
LEARNING APPROACH (2012).
49 See Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 7, at 824 ("modern courts have
consistently held (outside the [risk-based sentencing] context, that it is unconstitutional to
base sentences on gender"); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, Race and Gender as Explicit
Sentencing Factors, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 128 (2010) ("modern sentencing
systems do not permit the explicit consideration of race or gender"). While risk tools
consider gender as a factor to predict risk, tools do not consider race because it is
controversial and potentially unconstitutional. Some data scientists push to include race as
a factor in predictive models so as to control for it in the predictive outcomes.
50 See, e.g., Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 194; Jessica M. Eaglin, May
the Odds Be (Never) in Minorities'Favor? Breaking Down the Risk-Based Sentencing
Divide, HUFF. POST (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-eaglin/may-
the-odds-be-never-in- b_697651.html [https://perma.cc/D5Q3-7TAK].
51 For constitutional debate, compare Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 7, and
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REv. 671, 694 (2015) with J.C.
Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REv. 1329, 1340 (2011) (arguing constitutionally sound). For an
overview of the policy debate, see John Monahan, A Jurisprudence ofRisk Assessment:
Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 405-o6
(2006); John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 499 (2016).
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say yes, risk is a legitimate basis of differentiation. As such the
predictive accuracy of a risk tool is the most important factor to
ensure fairness at sentencing, regardless of the factors considered to
estimate that outcome.5 2 Others, myself included, argue that risk is
not an independently legitimate basis of differentiation at sentencing.
Because risk is simply the compilation of underlying factors with
varying degrees of legitimacy, justice requires considering the
development process when determining whether tools undermine
fairness at sentencing, not just the predictive outcome. 53 The entry of
predictive analytics for punishment exposes this conflict.
Tensions regarding what counts at sentencing and the meaning of
fairness may produce a mismatch between application of the
technique and the aims of the justice system. This concern is
exacerbated by the opacity accompanying the technique. Because
developers may not disclose the factors considered to predict risk,
defendants, criminal justice actors, and the general public cannot
know whether suspect factors impact risk scores used at sentencing.54
Relatedly, if courts do not disclose how risk scores affect a sentence,
defendants cannot know how these factors affect a sentence. Finally,
risk tools may obscure the debate about whether, why and when to
consider certain controversial factors at sentencing because predictive
analytics reframes the discourse around accuracy rather than
fairness.55
52 See, e.g., Oleson, supra note 51, at 1376 (arguing that courts may allow consideration of
race and other suspect classifications if it produces more accurate risk estimates for
sentencing); see also Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out: Criminal Justice Risk
Assessment and the Myth of Race Neutrality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (arguing that statistical accuracy in risk tools is an essential element of fairness,
but urging more nuance in what to predict).
53 See Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 7, at 870 (criticizing inclusion of
suspect factors in risk prediction tools on empirical and constitutional grounds); Sidhu,
supra note 52, at 674 ("risk assessment tools have no legitimate basis in any recognized
penological theories"); see also, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 91-94,
109 (arguing that statistical accuracy alone should not define legitimacy of risk tools for
sentencing).
54 See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); see also, Eaglin,
Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 111-21 (discussing opacity issues with risk tools).
55 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶ 86, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis.
2016) (upholding use of risk tools relying on gender as a predictive factor because "gender
promotes accuracy that ultimately inures the benefits of the justice system").
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IV. BEYOND PREDICTION
In summary, numerous issues arise in the construction of actuarial
risk tools that threaten to produce a mismatch between the
application of predictive analytics and a jurisdiction's aims when
imposing punishment. Some of the challenges identified here are
surmountable. Stakeholders could provide more precise information
for developers to apply predictive analytics in more valuable ways.
Democratic engagement with the normative construction choices
could occur. Indeed, Constructing Recidivism Risk proposes a variety
of measures to infuse the construction of actuarial risk tools with
public accountability as a means to prevent some of the threats that
tools present at sentencing.56
This section looks beyond whether predictive tools should be used
in the system. Rather, it considers whether, without intervention, risk
tools will be constructed to improve the system by reducing
unnecessary reliance on incarceration. In other words: if, as most
advocates of risk-based sentencing are careful to assert, risk tools can
reduce incarceration by producing objective, neutral and accurate
information about a defendant's risk that will lead to diverting more
low-level defendants and reserving limited resources for select high
risk defendants,57 will tools naturally be constructed to further those
decarcerative goals? Here, I express skepticism about that vision.
A. The Easy Route
Risk assessment tools are not the first effort to introduce
automation to sentencing. In the 1970s, widespread sentencing
critiques resulted in the creation of sentencing guidelines to inform
judicial sentencing discretion.58 Sentencing guidelines, created in the
56 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 105-21.
57 See, e.g., NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44o87, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2015) ("Assessment instruments might help increase
the efficiency of the justice system by identifying low-risk offenders who could be
effectively managed on probation rather than incarcerated, and they might help identify
high-risk offenders who would gain the most by being placed in rehabilitative programs");
Jordan M. Hyatt, Steven L. Chanenson, Mark H. Bergstrom, Reform in Motion: The
Promise and Perils ofIncorporating Risk Assessments and Cost-BenefitAnalysis into
Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 713 (2011) (incorporating risk tools can
alleviate resource constraints in Pennsylvania).
58 See Tonry, supra note 15, at 174.
1oo0 [Vol. 14.1
2017] EAGLIN 101
states and the federal system, seek to narrow the range of punishment
within which a judge exercises discretion at sentencing. At the federal
level, the sentencing guidelines created widespread opposition and
little popularity upon adoption.59 Judges and law and policymakers
alike criticized aspects of the tool, leading up to the deconstruction of
the guideline system through a series of Supreme Court cases on the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right.6o
To the extent that the federal guidelines are perceived as a failure,
it has as much to do with tool developers' inability to confront difficult
questions at sentencing and the political machinations behind its
creation as it does with the tool itself.61 The U.S. Sentencing
Commission declined to select a guiding purpose of punishment to
construct the guidelines; 62 instead the Commission adopted an
empirical approach that simply averaged out historical data on
judicial sentencing practices as a baseline. 63 The data that the
Commission used - presentence reports from a sample of 10,500
cases - was insufficient for the categories of cases covered by the
resulting guidelines. 64 Moreover, it merely correlated the mention of
59 See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1685 (1992) (noting "dismay
and evasion in the federal courts and the bar" over the first five years of implementing the
guidelines).
6o See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (rendering the federal sentencing
guidelines as advisory based on the Sixth Amendment jury trial right); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (invalidating a sentence under Washington State's
mandatory sentencing guideline scheme based on the jury trial right).
61 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 92-94, 117 (2005) (defending the idea of
sentencing guidelines but criticizing its development and implementation at the federal
level); Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 168o-81
(2012) (recognizing flaws in the construction and implementation of the federal sentencing
guidelines but defending the post-Booker advisory sentencing guidelines).
62 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § iAi.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2004) (noting
that "as a practical matter, in most sentencing decisions both [retributive and utilitarian]
philosophies may prove consistent with the same result"); see also Stephen Breyer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17-18
HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 17 (1988) (relying on past sentencing practice was an important
compromise to the difficult philosophical questions presented by constructing sentencing
guidelines).
63 KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 61 (1998).
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particular facts in the presentence reports to the sentence ultimately
imposed.65 The Commission also averaged select parole board
decisions as the "numerical anchor" to determine the average length
of sentence among defendants. 66 It excluded any sentences where the
defendant received probation rather than incarceration, and thereby
increased the average punishment in the data "overnight." 6 7 The
Commission additionally raised penalties for certain offenses, even
though this produced mechanized sentence ranges much more severe
than the empirical data supported. 68 Even after the federal guidelines
became advisory, the tool is considered unnecessarily punitive in
some instances. On this account, some judges categorically reject its
use for some types of cases.69
Similarities exist between this approach and the construction of
actuarial risk tools developed for sentencing. Like the federal
sentencing guidelines, many actuarial risk tools do not specify a
particular sentencing purpose for their use.70 Like the federal
sentencing guidelines, actuarial risk tools rely on already existing data
without critically engaging with flaws inherent to its repurposing. For
the guidelines, as described above, concern stemmed from how the
Commission reconstructed past sentencing practices. For the risk
assessment tools, such concerns arise due to use of arrest data and the
biases that data may reflect.71 These similarities suggest the need for
critical engagement with the construction stage when tools are
developed for use at punishment.
Without careful consideration and reflection in the construction of
actuarial tools, automated information produced through predictive
65 Id.
66 Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1281 (2016).
67 Id. (citing Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing:
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 297 (2013)).
68 See J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth
Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 710-11 (2011).
69 See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109-10 (2007) (allowing judges to
vary from the guideline recommendations based on policy disagreement "even in a mine-
run case" post-Booker).
70 See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 161.
71 See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 136-37 (discussing racial biases
reflected in arrest data).
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analytics may not improve the allocation of punishment in the justice
system. As I explain in Constructing Recidivism Risk, tool developers
have unique self-interests - like cost, access to data, and market
competition - that shape how they use data analytics to predict
recidivism risk.72 It shapes foundational decisions like what data to
use and the definition of recidivism selected when applying predictive
analytics for punishment outcomes. 73 These decisions have
consequences, intentional or not, that can discourage decarcerative
aims. For example, predicting future arrest is much easier than
predicting other outcomes because it occurs in a shorter period of
time. But predicting risk of arrest can replicate biases already existing
in the system that do not correlate with public safety.74 Predicting
failure to appear in the pretrial context may be easier because data
exists for repurposing, but this measure also captures defendants who
do not present public safety threats.75 In each instance, easier to
predict results are over-inclusive in whom they identify as a risk.
Over-inclusive estimates can encourage unnecessary incarceration.7 6
Rather than reducing this flaw in the system, tools may exacerbate it.
Advocates and scholars interested in applying predictive analytics
to the administration of justice should take heed. If the sentencing
guidelines provide any insight, it demonstrates the dangers in
producing information for punishment without careful reflection and
engagement. As predictive analytics continue to expand to influence
decision-making that can result in incarceration, the need for criminal
justice scholars and advocates to engage with the production of
information only increases.77 Unless we confront the difficult value
72 See, id. at 142-46; see also Gouldin, supra note 43 (describing similar incentives in
pretrial bail context).
73 See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 142-46; see also Solon Barocas &
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 671 (2016) (describing
foundational choices for predictive analytics in employment).
74 Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 95-97.
75 See Gouldin, supra note 43, at 885.
76 See, e.g., id. at 888-89 (risk tools nudge courts in a particular direction); Starr,
Evidence-Based Sentencing, supra note 7, at 862-64 (tools produce information meant to
change sentencing practices based on risk level).
77 On the increasing resonance of risk logic in criminal justice, see Hannah-Moffatt, supra
note 34, at 17 ("Despite its conceptual and methodological deficiencies, it is unlikely that
the emphasis on risk will dissipate").
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choices upfront, automated tools do not guarantee the improvements
sometimes promised.
B. Slavery to the Present
Skepticism regarding the expansion of predictive analytics to
allocate punishment reaches beyond skepticism about tool
construction. It goes to the very purpose of the tools' application: to
change the justice system. Predictive analytics fit - albeit awkwardly78
- into the larger evidence-based policy paradigm, which seeks to
expand interventions proven to "work." This model is, at its core,
"extraordinarily conservative."79 As Dr. Marie Gottschalk explains,
"such a narrow construction of evidence resting on what has already
been shown to work fosters a kind of slavery to the present."8 It
suggests that the way forward is to do what we've already done before,
only better.
In the punishment context, we've done predictions before with
deleterious result. States tried to embrace efforts to identify and
selectively incapacitate the most dangerous defendants in the 1980s
and 90s. 8 1 Those efforts translated into the policies and practices
focused on total incapacitation, including habitual offender laws and
mandatory minimum penalties for those who have any previous
connection to the criminal justice system. 8 2 These policies contributed
to the massive increase in size and scope of the incarcerated
population, which made the United States the lead incarcerator in the
world.83 Actuarial risk tools represent another attempt at selective
78 See supra note 19.
79 MARIE GorrSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 261 (2015) (quoting Todd Clear). See also Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm,
supra note lo, at 624-34 (chronicling the limits of drug courts as a mechanism to define
sentencing reforms).
8o See GOTrSCHALK, supra note 79, at 261.
81 HARCOURT, supra note 7, at 88; Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 222-
23.
82 Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence ofCriminal History on Risk
Assessments, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 80, 96 (2015); see also Eaglin, Against
Neorehabilitation, supra note lo, at 223.
83 See, Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, supra note 7, at 223-26.
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incapacitation, but with supposedly more accurate information. The
tools alone do not create a new way of thinking about punishment.
Of course, predictive risk information is both empowering and
debilitating in the face of mass incarceration. 8 4 After all, using the
tools cuts both ways - it provides a justification to increase or
decrease incarceration. Advocates of predictive analytics for individual
punishment embrace the empowering aspect of risk information -
perhaps people will take more risk because they can quantify it.
Through this lens, the information may facilitate new approaches to
punishment over time.
Yet this argument overlooks a key reality exposed by examining
the construction of actuarial risk tools. While scholars and
policymakers debate how stakeholders should use the information
produced by predictive analytics for punishment,85 they often overlook
questions about how risk should be produced. But risk is a malleable
and fluid concept. 86 It can reinforce present policies and practices, and
exacerbate current flaws, all while distancing the public from the
punished. Producing actuarial information on recidivism risk
necessarily takes a step towards a particular vision of the system
whether intended or not. Simply stated, producing predictive risk
information is not a neutral and objective process in the criminal
justice system; rather, it is a form of agenda-setting. 87
Unfortunately, recent history suggests that automated tools in the
criminal justice system tend to set the agenda in one direction:
towards more punishment. As Professor Andrea Roth explains, the
creation of mechanized tools, such as the guidelines, for sentencing
84 See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MOD. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1999) (risk
has a negative connotation, but it also emboldens initiatives by demonstrating alternative
options). For a definition of mass incarceration, see Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism,
supra note 7, at 191.
85 For an example of risk assessments as a tool of decarceration, see, Ball, supra note 14.
86 See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 137 (2012) ("A policy-shaping
conceptual framework such as risk builds upon underlying social models of agency,
causality, and responsibility. Such frames in turn are intellectually constraining in that
they delimit the universe of scientific inquiry, political discourse, and possible policy
options").
87 See, e.g., Pat O'Malley, Risk and Responsibility, in FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON:
LIBERALISM, NEOLIBERALISM, AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT (1996) ("Technologies,
although they have their own dynamic, nevertheless develop primarily in terms of their
role in relation to specific political programmes.").
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often subtly seek to "increase the uniformity and rationality of
punishment, but typically in a certain direction: away from undue
leniency."88 Risk assessment tools used at sentencing could be
different from previously developed automated tools. Time will tell.
History, however, is not on its side.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is a lead incarcerator in the world, our prisons
and jails are overcrowded, and racial disparities are rampant
throughout the system. 89 Mass incarceration and its effects plague
states across the country such that critics from the left and the right
demand changes to improve the system.90 Many suggest that
harnessing predictive analytics to inform decisions about the
imposition of punishment may provide a path forward to resolve
dilemmas spurring from the pressures of mass incarceration. But
application of this technique for individualized punishment threatens
to introduce mismatches between the information produced and the
aims of the criminal justice system to which it is applied. This essay
identifies possible mismatches through the lens of challenges faced
when constructing actuarial risk tools used for sentencing.
The mismatches between criminal justice and predictive analytics
make one thing clear: law must engage with the politics of producing
knowledge used to administer criminal justice. As states produce or
purchase data-driven tools to predict criminal risk, law scholars and
policymakers need to respond to ensure that the technique furthers
societal values and goals rather than just furthering the proliferation
8 Roth, supra note 66, at 1266.
89 Barack Obama, The President's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811, 816-19 (2017).
go See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES
REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 20-21
(2011), https://www.aclu.org/smart-reform-possible-states-reducing-incarceration-rates-
and-costs-while-protecting-communities [https://perma.cc/GJ8G-8GL4]; Mass
Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration#current
[https://perma.cc/757E-QYEV]; Crime and Justice, Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice [https://perma.cc/9AHD-AYF3]; NAACP
Criminal Justice Program Issues, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-issues/
[https://perma.cc/C5KE-NUTZ]; Civil & Criminal Justice, Texas Public Policy Foundation,
https://www.texaspolicy.com/issues/detail/civil-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/J8Z8-
L4EU].
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of tools. Prediction for its own sake may change society, but it does
not guarantee improvements in the imposition of punishment.

